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The Internet in the College Community
ROBERT M. O'NEIL"
INTRODUCTION

On March .19, 1997, the United States Supreme Court officially met the
Internet when it held oral arguments in Reno v. ACLU.' The case offers
the Justices not only a chance to pass upon the validity of the Communications Decency Act ("Act") 2 -more precisely, that provision which makes
it a crime to post "indecent" material where minors may access ie- but it
also affords the Court, for the first time, to pass upon basic issues concerning the nature of electronic communication and the degree to which such
communication resembles other forms of protected expression.
The key issue is whether current technology makes it possible for
providers to reach adults with sexually explicit material they have a right to
see, while keeping that material away from young viewers. Two lower
On that basis they found the
federal courts said that was not possible.!
indecency provision to be in violation of the free speech clause of the First
Amendment. Those judgments began the first phase of the Supreme Court's
journey into cyberspace.
The present topic is, however, a different if related one. Our agenda
is to explore some special challenges the Internet poses for the college and
university campus. In so doing, we will quite naturally pursue some larger
issues in regulating what is said in cyberspace. We will also consider how
* In August 1990, Professor O'Neil became the Founding Director of the Thomas

Jefferson Center for the Protection of Free Expression in Charlottesville, Virginia. He has
been a featured "Newsmaker" commentator for USA TODAY and a frequent commentator to
the Chronicle of HigherEducation.
Formerly president of the Universities of Virginia and Wisconsin, he continues as a
member of the University of Virginia's law faculty teaching courses in constitutional and
copyright law. He is a member of the Massachusetts Bar and the author of FREE SPEECH:
RESPONSIBLE COMMUNICATION

UNDER

LAW,

THE RIGHTS
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PUBLIC
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CLASSROOMS IN THE CROSSFIRE and FREE SPEECH IN THE COLLEGE COMMUNITY.
1. 117 S. Ct. 554 (1996); see Transcript of Oral Argument, Reno v. ACLU, 1997 WL
136253 (U.S. Oral Arg. Mar. 19, 1997).
9.
2. 47 U.S.C § 223(a)-(h) (West
3. 47 U.S.C. § 223(a)(1)(B).
4. See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Pa.), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 554
(1996), afftd, 117 S.Ct. 2329 (1997); Shea v. Reno, 930 F. Supp. 916 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
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far the First Amendment may view digital speech differently from the way
it views the printed and spoken word. These are questions that campus
administrators and attorneys face on an almost daily basis-with surprisingly
little guidance from the courts or even from scholars. Each issue in this
complex new arena is essentially a matter of first impression.
I. THREE CURRENT ELECTRONIC SPEECH CASES
To set the stage, let me report on three recent and intriguing incidents.
They come from California, Virginia and fairly close by in Illinois. Two
involve students, and one a professor. They are quite different in content,
linked only by the common use of the Internet, and by an absence of
familiar principles to resolve the central issue.
A. POLITICS AT CAL STATE-NORTHRIDGE

Let us go first to the West Coast. In June 1996, during a hotly
contested state senate race, a student at California State UniversityNorthridge ("CSUN") used his home page to attack the incumbent and tout
her rival.' That page had been created through the university's computer
system, and could be readily accessed through links from the institution's
general web site. This was no ordinary political message. Christopher
Landers, the student, set forth on the home page a traditional roster of pros
and cons, supporting his partisan and attacking the incumbent. But the piece
de resistance was visual. It started out with a regular head and shoulders
photo of California State Senator Cathie Wright. But as the viewer
watched, that image slowly changed into a very menacing skull-a not so
subtle slap at her coziness with tobacco interests. As the home page
metamorphosis ended, the Senator's platform was highlighted by that
gleaming skull.
This novel message soon came to the attention of Wright's campaign
manager, who demanded the university delete Landers' web page. The
cause of concern was partly the stigma created by the skull, but even more
5. See Stacy Finz, Student Wins Round ForFreeSpeech, L.A. DAILY NEWS, Feb. 15,
1997, at N3; Michael Sohigan & John Birke, Free CyberSpeech Applies to CSUN; Campus
Computer Server QualifiesAs Marketplaceof Ideas ProtectedBy Courts, Feb. 2, 1997, at
B 19; John Chandler, Judge Rules CSUN Erred in Shutting Down Web Page, @CSUN.EDU,
Jan. 27, 1997, at 2 <http://www.csun.edu/-hfoao102/@csun.edu/csun127_97/features/judge.html> (last visited May 20, 1997); Christopher Landers, Press Release 01/14/9

<http://www.csun.edu/-hbart020/prelease.html> (last visited May 24, 1997).
6. Mr. Lander's current homepage is devoted to his lawsuit with the university. See

Christoper Landers, Chris'ProtestPage<http://www.csun.edu/-hbart020/> (last visited May
24, 1997).
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it was California's deep and abiding aversion to use public resources for
partisan pursuits. CSUN officials immediately acceded to Senator Wrights's
demand, and blocked access to the home page in October of 1996, well
before the election.7 Undaunted, Mr. Landers went to court, claiming the
university had abridged his free speech.
The university had by this time narrowed and refined its computer use
policy. The administration argued it had acted reasonably - indeed was
compelled to act by a California law that forbids the use of any state
resources "for partisan political purposes." On January 14, 1997, however,
a state trial court judge upheld the student's claim.8 She ruled that CSUN
had unlawfully censored a protected political message. Finding that the
university had created a "limited public forum" through its computer system,
the judge found no constitutionally adequate grounds for the removal of
political material. Thus she ordered administrators to take no further action
against Landers, and by implication to keep its electronic hands off any
other student-created digital material of a similar kind. The case is still in
court, with an appeal likely after a final ruling at the trial level.
Meanwhile, CSUN finds itself in a classic bind: On one hand, state law
insists that public universities prevent the use of their facilities and resources
for partisan politics. On the other hand, state courts have thus far denied
the university the one remedy which would enable it to deal effectively with
political messages posted through its computer network. It would be hard
to imagine a more poignant dilemma.
B. DISSONANCE AT VIRGINIA

Let me now cross the country, and share with you a recent incident at

my own University. It too involves a web page created by a resourceful

student. One evening a wealthy alumnus was browsing the Internet in

search of references to his rather uncommon surname. When he encountered such a reference on the web page of one of our undergraduates, his
initial reaction was one of pride and delight. He clicked on the reference,
and awaited an electronic encounter with a putative cousin. When the
graphics began to emerge, however, those feelings quickly turned to shame
and disgust. It seemed that the undergraduate, of like name but apparently
not related, had used his webpage to do what lots of students do these days
- to push the limits of taste and style in his choice of visual material.
Though this page has now been removed for non-content reasons, I am
assured it was explicit and highly distasteful.

7. See Fintz, supra note 5, at N3.
8. See Chandler, supra note 5, at 2.
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It was hardly surprising that our apoplectic alumnus called the
President's office to demand the removal of the web page. The President
wisely turned the issue over to the General Counsel and the Vice President
for Student Affairs and Information Technology. They are reported to have
debated at length, hoping the semester would end and the network could be
cleansed before the alumnus actually appeared in person.
This case nicely illustrates the effects of changes in media. Suppose
a wealthy graduate, during a physical tour of the campus, saw his surname
linked to explicit visual material on a kiosk. He would probably be no less
indignant than was our net-surfing alumnus. He would quite likely make
a similar complaint to the administration. But the options would be few, at
least for a public university. If the poster had been properly attached at a
site where such displays are permitted, and if the content were not legally
obscene or otherwise unlawful, you would politely explain principles of free
speech to the indignant alumnus. There is no campus regulation that forbids
"debasing the surname of prominent graduate through display of graphic or
explicit visual material."
Simply to state the putative charge, in fact, provides the answer. If
Larry Flynt has a First Amendment right to caricature and ridicule Reverend
Jerry Falwell in his magazine,9 surely our student has a right to sully the
family name in a far less visible medium. So the poster on the kiosk is easy
in principle - even though it might entail some awkward moments in
practice. What is difficult about the web page is not only the different
medium, and the different impact of that medium, but also the uncertain
degree to which the university could be said to have made its resources
available for such a purpose. That factor, as we shall see, cuts both ways,
and makes finding answers even more challenging.
C. ANTI-SEMITISM AT NORTHWESTERN

It is now time to meet our third digital malefactor, who is a relatively
near neighbor. Professor Arthur R. Butz has for over twenty years been a
tenured professor of engineering at Northwestern University in Chicago,
Illinois. Apparently his teaching of technical subjects has been without
fault. Professor Butz differs from his colleagues, however, in one
significant respect. For most of his years at Northwestern, he has publicly
and persistently claimed that the Holocaust never happened - that several
million Jews in Europe somehow became terminally ill or committed suicide
between 1933 and 1945. These views are set forth in a book titled The

9. See Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
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Hoax of the Twentieth Century, the jacket of which correctly identifies the
author as a Northwestern professor.
Over the years, Northwestern has felt recurrent pressure to stifle
Professor Butz, or at least his views on the Holocaust. Commendably,
university officials and trustees have resisted those pressures. They insist
that such aberrational views fall within Butz' academic freedom, even
though close to testing its limits. Thus they have patiently explained to
alumni, community groups and many others why Butz remains a member
of the faculty in good standing even though he spews hateful and demonstrably false notions about the most tragic events of our century.
Recently, however, Professor Butz has taken his views on-line. In late
1996, he added explicit Holocaust denial to his Internet home page.'" The
medium has thus changed, and some argue the equities have also altered.
Critics who uneasily tolerated Butz in print now argue that Butz on-line has
gone one step too far, and must be muzzled. Northwestern officials have,
however, refused to change their basic position. While condemning his
hateful views about the Holocaust, as they have done for years in the print
world, they insist that academic freedom does not diminish when the words
appear in digital form. Thus, the Holocaust denial remains on-line, just as
Professor Butz posted it several months ago.

I. GENERAL PRINCIPLES: FREE SPEECH IN DIFFERENT MEDIA,
This may be an appropriate point to focus on our central issue:
Recognizing there are important differences between expression on the
Internet and speech in other forms, how far do those differences permit or even require - a different First Amendment standard? It may be useful
to identify a few of those differences. Speech in cyberspace, for one thing,
can reach millions in an instant, far beyond the potential immediate impact
of the printed or even the broadcast word. It is also the case that the
Internet seems to bring out the worst in some users; a good many people
who are polite in print somehow turn into demons when they go on-line,
engaging in vicious flaming, spamming and other extreme forms of
discourse.
Anonymity poses another important difference: While we are familiar
with unsigned letters and phone calls that involve little more than heavy

10. Arthur R. Butz, Home Web PageofArthurR. Butz <http://pubweb.acns.nwu.edu/
-abutz> (last visited May 20, 1997); see Edward Walsh, Professor'sHolocaust Views Put
Freedom Issues On Line, WASH. POST, Jan. 12, 1997, at A3; Laurel S. Walters, Tenure
Comes Under Stricter Review Multiyear Contracts Win Favor As Colleges Seek More
FlexibilityandRein In Costs, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Apr. 24, 1997, at 12.
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breathing, anonymous e-mail may create a new level of anxieties. The
recipient has no idea whether the unsigned message comes from halfway
around the world, or just around the comer, and with current technology, we
may have no reliable way to find out.
Access to potentially troubling material - sexually explicit images, for
example - is becoming so much easier, so rapidly, that a technically savvy
minor can almost certainly obtain forbidden graphics much more easily by
computer than through the laborious process of getting a friend or older
sibling to reach behind the top shelf for a cellophane wrapped copy of
Penthouse or Hustler. In these and other ways, cyberspace is undeniably
different, though it is far less clear how far these differences warrant a
diluted standard of free expression.
Let me propose one very simple principle, which I fervently hope the
Supreme Court will espouse in its Communications Decency Act judgment:
Speech in cyberspace should be as free from government restraint as is the
printed or spoken word, save to the extent that special qualities of the
medium itself may warrant a lower standard.
Let me illustrate this maxim with a case that will bring us back to
campus realities. If a student posts photos of naked women on a kiosk in
the central campus plaza, someone will quite likely tear them down. Even
if it attracts a large and restive crowd, such a poster could not be punished
at a public university under any rule with which I am familiar.
Now let us move the same images into cyberspace. Suppose news of
the posting of such material on the student's home page spreads rapidly
across the campus network, and so many other users seek to access it that
a "traffic jam" results. Such congestion might well threaten to shut down
the whole system, or at least severely hamper its operations. The computing
center director might well conclude that only rapid intervention would
protect the rest of the system and the communications of other users. Thus
the offending material might be removed, or access to it might be blocked
for a time. Such action would reflect no judgment about the message or
viewpoint, but a wholly valid concern for its potential effect on the
communications of others. Even here, though, we should proceed with
caution. The "traffic jam" principle bears an ominous resemblance to the
claim that a speaker can be silenced if the message unsettles or provokes a
crowd. That sort of "heckler's veto," as Supreme Court Justice Hugo Black
warned a half century ago," would allow the stifling of protected speech
for what may well be a contrived pretext, often based on the unreviewable

11. See Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315, 326 (1951) (Black, J., dissenting).
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judgment of the police. For much the same reasons, we should insist on an
independent review before the computing center blocks access or removes
the display that creates the digital "traffic jam." Only in that way could we
be certain that a genuine need exists, which could not be met in a less
drastic way, and that the popularity of the web site is not simply a pretext
for suppressing material the administration finds undesirable or embarrassing.
The case of the "traffic jam" does, however, offer one example (the
only good one that comes to mind) of restrictions that may be permissible
in cyberspace for reasons that have no ready analogue or counterpart in
print. The basic precept remains firm, however: Where such novel
conditions do not exist, speech on the Internet should be as free from
government restraint as the spoken or printed word.
I. APPLYING GENERAL PRINCIPLES TO CYBERSPACE

Before we are comfortable with that conclusion, however, we need to note
a few other factors that might warrant different approaches to the Internet.
Let us return for a moment to Professor Arthur Butz. Northwestern officials
have, as I noted earlier, insisted that Butz on-line is no different form Butz
in print.'2 Others take a less generous view. One such skeptic is the
Simon Weisenthal Center in Los Angeles, which monitors anti-Jewish
propaganda and attacks.' 3 Last year the Center conducted a survey of hate
material, especially anti-Semitic hate material, that appeared on college and
university web pages. They found an alarming amount of neo-Nazi, Aryan
Nation and other such postings in places accessible through links from
campus home pages.
Rabbi Abraham Cooper, the Center's director, wrote to university
presidents around the country, acknowledging the importance of free speech
and academic freedom, but urging steps to curb or reduce the incidence of
such hateful material.'
Many institutions responded sympathetically,
though it is too early to chart the impact.
What Rabbi Cooper and others note about Professor Butz on-line are
two features distinctive to cyberspace. On one hand, the potential reach of
such hateful material is magnified many fold. Since its publication, Butz'

12. See Walsh, supra note 10, at A3.
13. See Katharine Webster, Rights Group Seeks Censorship of On-Line White
Supremacists,ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Jan. 21, 1996, at 38A; Greg Williams, Hate Groups
Using the Internetto Spread TheirRacist Message, PHILADELPHIA TRIBUNE, Jan. 23, 1996,
at IA.
14. See Webster, supra note 13, at 38A.
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book has probably reached a few thousand people, mostly in this country.
But the moment the same views went on the Internet, they became instantly
and easily available to millions of users around the world. Such expansion
of clientele may be only a matter of degree, but dramatically so. The other
difference is both subtler and more substantial. The relationship between
the university and the professor is different in cyberspace. In an almost
technical sense, Butz' use of the university's computing network was an
essential means or medium for this new and broader communication. While
the cost to the institution of adding one more faculty member's web page
may be negligible, the value to the user is substantial. Yet the real concern
is not one of cost or value - but rather of apparent attribution.
It was not simply that the material could be posted and accessed
through university links but, as one of Butz' colleagues argued, that the
posting "makes it appear that it's carried out with Northwestern's imprimatur." This colleague, who happened to be Jewish but expressed views
shared by some non-Jews, put his objection this way: "I didn't object to
[Butz'] material being on the Web. But don't publish it so it appears that
I and other faculty members are a party to what I consider a libel."' 5
The issue of attribution deserves elaboration. While Butz has long
been identified on the jacket of his book as a Northwestern engineering
professor, no reader would seriously believe on that basis that the university
sponsors, or even condones, the book's contents or its outrageous assertions.
That would still be true even if the book had been published by the
Northwestern University Press. But when one encounters such aggressive
anti-Semitism on a professor's web page, a subtly different inference might
arise. Of course no one would seriously believe that the university had
endorsed the contents of myriad web sites accessible through its home page.
Yet prospective students who wish to learn more about Northwestern, and
quite naturally accessing its web page for that purpose, could encounter
faculty Holocaust-denial mixed in with admission procedures, lists of
Evanston restaurants and cultural events, and an attractive campus map.
The most nearly comparable experience for a future student physically
visiting the campus would be finding a copy of Butz' book on display at
the university bookstore or in the library. That would entail a quite
different level of emotional assault. Yet, as I have already noted, I applaud
the view that Northwestern's board and administration have taken over the
years toward Professor Butz and his aberrant views. Academic freedom
protects even the right of a scholar, as citizen, to be egregiously and
offensively wrong on so sensitive and deeply divisive an issue.

15. See Walsh, supra note 10, at A3.
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Before returning to our other two cases, let me add one caution. Butz'
mischievous views must be tolerated in part because they are remote from
his academic discipline. His field is electrical engineering, which has
nothing to do with the Holocaust. But suppose instead his specialty were
modem European history. Even if his teaching and scholarship were
impeccable with regard to the British Isles, the Scandinavian countries and
Southern Europe, so erroneous a view about German history would be far
harder to tolerate.
The classic case is that of flat-earth advocacy, which is tolerable for
teachers of literature, philosophy and classics. But if a geographer or
geologist insists, in or out of class, that the surface of the earth does not
bend or curve, that goes beyond the bounds because it demonstrates a basic
lack of competence in the discipline. Assuming due process and an
institutional burden of proof, dismissal could be contemplated. So too a
historian of modem Germany or contemporary Europe, who widely and
persistently denied the Holocaust, might risk dismissal for betraying a basic
lack of core competence. But to repeat, that situation is quite different from
Professor Butz who, as far as we know, has never shown any comparable
lack of competence in his discipline. 6
Such a review of the Butz situation brings us back to the other two
cases I posed at the start. The one that arose at my own university - the
sullying of the once proud surname by a student's tasteless web page - was
wisely resolved through informal means. It would be difficult to fashion a
policy that would either prevent the posting of such material, or would
permit a public university to bring about its removal for anything short of
a criminal law violation. If the material is legally obscene, or contains child
pornography, then of course it can be removed and the student posting it
would have no recourse - indeed, the student should be grateful the
university web-master beat the police to the site. In the future, those using
the campus network to design and post personal web pages might get more
elaborate lessons in etiquette. But that is about as far as I could envision
a public college or university intruding standards of taste on student-posted
material that is lawful and presumably protected.
It is the skull displacing the California senator's photograph that needs
further discussion. The very imagery is unique to cyberspace; while faces
on elaborately programmed billboards can change from benign to malignant,
no student is likely to put such a display on a campus building. If a student
posts political barbs on kiosks around campus, no candidate would believe
the administration is in any way complicit. The most that could be charged
16. See ROBERT M. O'NEIL,

FREE SPEECH IN THE COLLEGE COMMUNITY,

49 (1997).
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is that the institution has created physical space on which students can
display offending or insulting material. Even in California, where political
activity on state university campuses is unusually constrained, no one
believes that administrators can purge all such material. They must be
careful not to facilitate campaigning, much less mandate or sponsor it, but
that is effectively the limit of responsibility.
Conditions may be different in cyberspace, in two ways. On one hand,
an inference of attribution may arise with respect to material of this sort
posted on a student home page that was created, and made accessible,
through the university's general home page. Most of what appears on that
home page is, after all, official university material. Even if disclaimers are
posted around the student pages, everyone knows that campus resources
were used and that campus links offer one avenue of access. Thus, the
political attack on the student home page is different from the same material
on the kiosk.
It was for that reason the CSUN administration argued, with what
seemed to me considerable validity, that it was legally required to remove
political material in order to comply with the California law that barred
using state resources for partisan purposes. That plea, as we know, fell on
deaf judicial ears.
Cyberspace also complicates the other side of the equation. The action
that Cal State-Northridge administrators took - removing or blocking the
student home page after the senator complained - seemed to the court far
closer to official censorship (like muzzling a student newspaper, for
example) than would the removal of a single flier or poster from a kiosk.
The superior court judge who chided university officials for having taken
that step found that the campus had created a limited public forum, rather
like a podium set up on the central plaza for rallies and demonstrations.
Moreover, she was concerned that the subject matter was political
speech, the most clearly protected of messages. Thus, as she observed in
her ruling from the bench: "This is what I think universities are supposed
to be about.... This is kind of an easy case. At least this kid was involved
in politics . . . . "7 The import of that ruling seems clear, though it leaves
campus computer operators in a quandary.
One other recent ruling in Loving v. Boren 8 may ease the computer
center's dilemma slightly. In early 1996, a journalism professor named Bill
Loving sued the president of his institution, the University of Oklahoma, for
blocking access through the campus computer system to a host of alt.sex

17. See Chandler, supra note 5, at 2.
18. 956 F. Supp. 953 (W.D. Okla. 1997).
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newsgroups. He claimed that such action denied him access to digital
material, much of which was perfectly lawful, in violation of his First
Amendment rights. The two parties invoked quite different analogies. For
Professor Loving, the restrictive action was comparable to telling faculty
members they could no longer check certain materials out of the library
because the administration found the content offensive. The administration
saw the issue quite differently - much closer to a librarian's refusal (or
financial inability) to buy and circulate every new book that any professor
might wish to read.
In late January, 1997, the federal judge in Oklahoma City dismissed the
suit, though without choosing between these analogies. He ruled simply that
Professor Loving (who represented himself in court) had failed to prove the
degree of harm or injury that is vital for a civil rights or civil liberties claim
filed in a federal forum.' 9 While it might cost Loving a bit more, the
judge felt he could obtain the material he sought through one of the
commercial Internet service providers like America Online, CompuServe or
Prodigy and therefore rendered his claim moot.2" The university computing network was not, in short, the only possible source. The basis of this
ruling of course avoids the merits, and postpones for another day (and a
stronger case) the testing of faculty and student claims to access lawful but
offensive material trough campus computing channels.
IV. GUIDANCE FOR CAMPUS COMPUTING SYSTEMS

Finally, what suggestions for guidance of campus administrators may
emerge from these early skirmishes? One is struck by the absence of rules
or policies specifically tailored for cyberspace. Sometimes the existing
regulations, designed for print-era speech, may turn out to be surprisingly
useful. At other times, with some creativity, old-fashioned rules may be
adapted to fit new challenges. In still other situations, the print-era rules
may simply not fit at all, and the need may be clear for rules shaped to fit
the Internet. There have been some early and commendable efforts to frame

19. Id. at 954-55. Loving sought an injunction against the university's actions as well
as a declaratory judgment. The court held that Loving failed to present any evidence
demonstrating that he was irreparably harmed by the restricted Internet use, an essential
element to relief by injunction. Id. at 955. Additionally, Loving failed to show how the
university's actions affected him personally to establish an actual case or controversy for
declaratory relief. Id. While Loving may have touched upon these elements in his argument,
the court noted that such material is not considered evidence and therefore he failed to
establish the necessary elements of his claim. Id.
20. Id. at 956 ("[T]he Court agrees that the fact of alternative routes to reach the
blocked news groups does make Plaintiff's claim moot.")
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such rules - though the creativity of high-tech students is such that reality
seems a couple of steps ahead of the rule-makers.

Second, there needs to be clear recognition of the potential of rules that
are not aimed at expression in either print or electronic form. My earlier
"traffic jam" illustration suggests the utility of regulations that focus more
on effect than on content, and thus avoid stigmatizing message or viewpoint.2
Computer center directors and system operators must have
authority to protect the network from destructive overload, without regard

to the material that creates the problem.

One other example, of a quite different sort, might be helpful. In late

1995, a homophobic student at Virginia Tech invaded a gay and lesbian
student chat room set up through the campus computing system.22 His
deeply offensive comments and slurs effectively drove the regular users
away and shut down the chat room. University officials found no print-era
rule that covered the case. One could possibly draw an analogy to the
physical invasion of a gay and lesbian group meeting in a student union
meeting room, the willful disruption of which would be punishable under
traditional rules. Such action would imply no focus on the content of the
invader's message, but would target the acts of invasion and disruption.
Third, I have already suggested that more creative use of digital
disclaimers may be helpful. Northwestern might clarify its degree of noninvolvement in Professor Butz' home page. California State-Northridge
could distance itself, before the next election, from material that state law
says it may not disseminate but a state judge says it may not remove. And
the University of Virginia could hope that alumni seeking long-lost relatives
among current students would recognize the institution's remoteness from
what undergraduates post on their home pages.
Fourth, the Loving case at Oklahoma University suggests the need for
clearer policies on access through campus computers to lawful but explicit
and potentially troublesome material. This issue has been problematic at
several other institutions. Some years ago, Stanford removed access to
alt.sex newsgroups, but quickly rescinded this action.23 Later Carnegie-

21. See supra pp. 196-197.
22. Michael D. Shear, Free Speech Gets Tangled In the 'Net; Colleges Try to Balance
Rights, Cybersensitivity,WASH. POST, Oct. 23, 1995, at AI.
23. John Schwartz, School Gives Computer Sex the Boot; Carnegie Mellon University
Taking Discussion Groups Off Its Network, WASH. POST, Nov. 6, 1994, at A26. In 1989,
Stanford University removed access to sex newsgroups and newsgroups devoted to sharing
jokes. Id.
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Mellon University took a similar step.24 Intense protest caused it to rein25
state access to text, but continue to study access to the visual materials.
After a year of study, the policy retained the potential for blocking access
arguably unlawful material, even if accompanied
to newsgroups that carried
26
graphics.
by lawful
Meanwhile, several states (including my own) have passed laws that
require government agencies, including universities, to prevent the use of
state computers to access sexually explicit material. 27 There are bound to
be many more such issues in the next few years, even if the Supreme Court
agrees with the lower courts that Congress cannot ban on the Internet any
category of material as broad as "indecent" material.
Finally, it is already clear that this is an area where creativity and
ingenuity are in great demand. Those who use the Internet extensively are
not likely to be long deterred from sending and receiving messages they
really wish to convey. Yet institutions will be under growing pressure to
regulate certain facets of just such communication. One can only say at this
very early stage: "Stay tuned."
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